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	<title>Securism Blog &#187; passwords</title>
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		<title>Secure Password Management</title>
		<link>http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/secure-password-management/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/secure-password-management/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 20 Dec 2008 19:44:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jon Janego</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Securism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[password policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/secure-password-management/" title="Secure Password Management"></a>Following up on my post about passwords and physical security, I&#8217;d like to discuss a couple suggestions for secure password management.  This primarily applies to the unfortunate (but common) case where a team is sharing common logins and passwords.  We &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/secure-password-management/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/secure-password-management/" title="Secure Password Management"></a><p>Following up on <a href="http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/password-policy-physical-security-and-keeping-the-cat-in-the-bag/">my post about passwords and physical security</a>, I&#8217;d like to discuss a couple suggestions for secure password management.  This primarily applies to the unfortunate (but common) case where a team is sharing common logins and passwords.  We see this a lot with internal teams, especially in lab and development environments.</p>
<p>A few months ago I saw a good <a href="http://www.joelonsoftware.com/items/2008/09/11b.html">blog post</a> by <a href="http://www.joelonsoftware.com/">Joel Spolsky</a>, where he suggested using a combination of <a href="http://getdropbox.com">Dropbox</a> and <a href="http://passwordsafe.sourceforge.net/">Password Safe</a> as a secure password management tool.  For those unfamiliar with it, Dropbox is an Amazon Cloud-based service that essentially acts as a network-based hard disk that can be synced across multiple machines.  Local copies of files are retained on the user&#8217;s machine and changes are synced with the main file server and distributed to the user&#8217;s other machines with the Dropbox client installed.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s a great tool and I would recommend it to anyone &#8211; and when used with Password Safe (install your encrypted password file on the dropbox-synced folder), it&#8217;s an effortless and secure method for an individual user to manage their passwords.</p>
<p>In an enterprise level IT environment, however, it&#8217;s probably not the best choice.  I can&#8217;t think of any responsible administrator who&#8217;d consider turning over a password list to an untrusted 3rd party, as anonymous or as encrypted as it may be.  It&#8217;s just not worth the risk.</p>
<p>The alternative, then, is to leverage a similar method using more secure means.  Our team uses a <a href="http://www.netgear.com/Products/Storage.aspx">NAS</a> device, which is an ideal and cost-effective candidate for similar functionality.  If your IT organization has large-scale production file servers which are regularly backed up and maintaned, that would be an even better candidate.</p>
<p>The missing piece in this suggestion is file synchronization &#8211; a killer feature of Dropbox.  There are a few different ways to take handle this &#8211; either using one of the many <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_synchronization#Open-source">file synchronization tools</a>, or a versioning system such as <a href="http://www.nongnu.org/cvs/">CVS</a> or <a href="http://subversion.tigris.org/">Subversion</a>.  The choice is yours, but allowing the user to maintain a local copy of the folder is a critical component &#8211; because what happens if the file server goes down and the user forgets a shared password?</p>
<p>A careful security administrator will keep these circumstances in mind and plan for them accordingly.  Don&#8217;t be &#8220;that guy&#8221; who assumes his file servers will be up 100% of the time!  That&#8217;s what security is all about &#8211; hoping for the best, yet planning for the worst.</p>
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		<title>Password Policy, Physical Security, and Keeping the Cat in the Bag</title>
		<link>http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/password-policy-physical-security-and-keeping-the-cat-in-the-bag/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/password-policy-physical-security-and-keeping-the-cat-in-the-bag/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Dec 2008 18:05:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jon Janego</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Securism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[password policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[physical security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.securism.com/?p=30</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/password-policy-physical-security-and-keeping-the-cat-in-the-bag/" title="Password Policy, Physical Security, and Keeping the Cat in the Bag"></a>Password policy is one of the most frustrating subjects for any IT or Security administrator.  You&#8217;re stuck in a &#8220;Damned if you do, damned if you don&#8217;t&#8221; situation, where no matter what you do the users will complain.  Something that &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/password-policy-physical-security-and-keeping-the-cat-in-the-bag/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://blog.securism.com/2008/12/password-policy-physical-security-and-keeping-the-cat-in-the-bag/" title="Password Policy, Physical Security, and Keeping the Cat in the Bag"></a><p>Password policy is one of the most frustrating subjects for any IT or Security administrator.  You&#8217;re stuck in a &#8220;Damned if you do, damned if you don&#8217;t&#8221; situation, where no matter what you do the users will complain.  Something that I like to keep in mind when considering password policies is the careful balance between <em>security</em> and <em>usability</em>.</p>
<p>On one hand, there are fairly well-established best practices regarding password policies.  Non-dictionary words, 8-15 characters, etc.  SANS has a great (if a little strict) password policy document <a href="http://www.sans.org/resources/policies/Password_Policy.pdf">here</a> which is a great starting point for any security administrator.</p>
<p>On the other hand, users have a hard time remembering complicated passwords, especially ones that are frequently rotated.  A well-enforced password policy won&#8217;t let users choose their name, dictionary-based words, or any other &#8216;easy&#8217; passwords, so the user is stuck with having to remember a complicated acrostic, or a random string of characters.  And what do users tend to do in this situation?  Write down the password.</p>
<p>So, what&#8217;s wrong with this practice?  Nothing!  It&#8217;s even been <a href="http://news.cnet.com/Microsoft-security-guru-Jot-down-your-passwords/2100-7355_3-5716590.html">advocated</a> by various <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/06/write_down_your.html">security gurus</a> for years.  But you need adequate physical controls around the password list.  That&#8217;s the rub &#8211; in a large IT organization,  how does one protect from users carrying around scraps of paper?  Adding a further layer of complication, what about the case of shared logins and passwords?  The problem can become overwhelming quickly.</p>
<p>In an IT environment where <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role-based_access_control">Role-Based Access Controls</a> (RBAC) are implemented, I would be inclined to not explicitly discourage users from writing down their individual passwords &#8211; because we&#8217;re all pretty good at physically controlling pieces of paper (money, anyone?).  I may encourage the use of a tool such as <a href="http://passwordsafe.sourceforge.net/">Password Safe</a>,  but there&#8217;s only so much that you can do to control the behavior of the users.</p>
<p>Where common usernames and passwords are shared between many people (a tragic case!), the problem of password management becomes much trickier.  I&#8217;ve seen systems with multiple versions of a common password list, with each user having their own copy.  I&#8217;ve seen password lists distributed betweeen a dozen users via unencrypted email.  I&#8217;ve seen printed sheets of passwords &#8220;hidden&#8221; underneath the keyboard of a common workstation.  I&#8217;ve seen post-it-notes on monitors.  All of these situations are terrible, but in reality, they&#8217;re also unavoidable.  The best an administrator control for is to provide adequate physical controls; limiting access to the password lists.  It would take a very highly-motivated attacker to get past a security guard, keycarded doors, and a staff that&#8217;s advised to pay attention to unrecognized people in the building &#8211; and your security response policy should take into account the situation of a password breach and have plans for rapidly shutting down access and rotating shared passwords.</p>
<p>In summary, there&#8217;s only so much that you can do to control the behavior of users, especially when asking them to remember complicated passwords.  I would advocate RBAC authenticating against a common directory server in all possible circumstances, so that a breached username and password can be compartmentalized, protecting against damage.  If that&#8217;s not possible, educating the users about controlling access to their passwords, and providing for adequate physical controls is about the best you can do.  And as always, having a response policy that takes into account the circumstances of a password breach is <em>critical</em>.  IT has evolved to the point where users are getting comfortable with the strictness of password policies, but as an administrator or security professional, it&#8217;s important to consider the vulnerabilities and to keep in mind the careful balance of usability and security.</p>
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